This paper investigates the factors affecting the access of rural individual and group-based households to formal credit in the Mekong Delta (MD), Vietnam. Poverty levels in the Mekong Delta have reduced significantly over the last decades, but in the rural areas they remain significant. If it is assumed that access to credit is a vehicle for poverty alleviation, it is necessary to assess how households decide on borrowing. This paper identifies the determinants of the decision to borrow and of the amount that is borrowed by using the double hurdle model and Heckman selection model. Data used in this paper was obtained from a survey of 325 rural households, conducted between May and October 2009. The results indicate that household's capital endowments, marital status, family size, distance to the market center, and locations affect the probability to ask for and amount of credit.
Introduction
Vietnam has been transforming from a centrally-planned to a market-oriented economy since the Doi Moi (innovation) policy which was initiated in the late 1980s. The result of the policy has been a steady annual economic growth of 4.6% in the 1980s, 7.6% in the 1990s and 7% in 2008. This economic success may be considered as a good achievement in the light of surging inflation and global economic downturn. Yet, poverty levels remain relatively high in rural areas, with the inequality in development between rural and urban areas still being large. Moreover, the gap between rural and urban incomes is even increasing. Rural economies in Vietnam therefore deserve more attention and support, if rural poverty is to be contained (Heltberg, 2003; Fritzen and Brassard, 2005) . The economic success in Vietnam is partly attributed to the development of the financial system (Quach et al. 2003) .
In rural development programs, the government uses credit programs in an attempt to provide the rural poor with access to cheap credit, in order to increase productivity and output in farm and rural non-farm sectors. Access to credit is considered to be an important tool for smoothing consumption and promoting production especially for poor households (e.g. Swain et al. 2008; Conning and Udry, 2005; Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; Robinson, 2001; Zeller et al. 1997 ). Armendariz and Morduch (2005) , amongst others, argue that microfinance makes households wealthier, through an income effect that improves total consumption levels; and it also seems to have a positive impact on the demand for children's health care and education, as well as leisure.
Like other developing countries, the rural financial system in Vietnam as well as Mekong Delta includes a formal, semi-formal and an informal sector. The former has been developed and quickly competed with other institutions. The formal credit sector followed the traditional approach (Ha, 2001) . It is estimated that the formal sector accounts for only one-third of credit demand (Cao, 1997) . However, this share of the formal sector has been increasing in recent years. Schipper (2002) reported that it was about 45%, using data from VLSS 2002. As a result, the share of credit supply of the informal sector has been decreasing from 73% in 1993 to 51% in 1998 (Nguyen, 2001) . The rest will be accounted by the semi-formal sectors.
Arguably, the success of credit provision for poverty reduction depends on the possible access by poor households to credit-providing institutions. This level of access depends on the relationship of the demand and supply for rural credit. The former depends on households' decisions on whether they want to borrow and how large the loans are, while the latter is an outcome of the credit rationing policy of the financial institutions. Obviously, households need credit when they lack financial assets for consumption and production, and their lack of it will depend on the household's characteristics and the intended use of that credit.
Several studies have investigated the determinants of households' demand for credit from different institutions using multinomial discrete choice models (for example, Barslund and Tarp, 2008; Pham and Lensink, 2007; Akoten et al. 2006) . In Pham and Lensink (2007) , the model confirms that, the supply of credit from formal, semi-formal and informal sources in Vietnam depends on the possible profits that can be made from the use of the loans. They add that credit supply may also increase if borrowers provide collateral, a guarantor and/or if the credit is for business-related activities. For the case of Indonesia, Takahashi et al. (2010) found that the access to credit is significantly affected by the relatively wealthier households but not by collateral ownership. In Bangladesh, the relation between gender (women) and access to microcredit is discussed by Rahman et al. (2009) .
In this article we build on the analysis of Pham and Lensink (2007) yet we focus on lending from formal institutions. We analyze how household characteristics' affect the uptake and amount of credit. Getting a better insight in the reasons causing the gap between demand and supply of rural credit at household level is indispensable for evaluating the current outreach of the microfinance institutions and for improving credit accessibility in Vietnamese rural areas. Reportedly, very few empirical studies have so far dealt with the determinants of a households' access to credit in the MD region (Putzeys, 2002; Ninh, 2003) .
Our analysis focuses on the provision of microcredit by formal institutions. We think this is relevant because in the MD the decision to borrow from informal sources is less constraining in collateral (see Pham and Lensink, 2007) , and also probably less easily influenced by policy makers. It is also assumed that availability of small loans without collateral requirement greatly increases households' probability to borrow . Finally, it is important to note that our analysis is based on the borrower's characteristics. We acknowledge the importance of the lender and their need for credit rationing and careful client selection. Yet, arguably, it is the household that needs to tile a request for credit to the lending institution, and the decision to do so is deterministic for the access to credit and eventually also for the amount borrowed.
This study is based on household data that was collected among a group of borrowers and non-borrowers in three provinces in the MD region in 2009 as shown in figure 1. A distinct contribution of this paper is the comparison of two systems, individual and group-based lending, a double hurdle model and a Heckman selection model are used to calculate the probability of households to borrow and the loan amount taken out. Before discussing the methodology, a background on rural credit in Vietnam and its development is given in the next section.
Research Background
The Vietnamese rural financial system is composed of formal, semi-formal and informal credit providers. The former includes the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP), and the People Credit Funds (PCF) (World Bank, 2002) . They are generally well-developed in the rural areas and there is little competition amongst these formal institutions. However, the formal institutions seem not to be able to respond adequately to all rural household's demand for credit; and the remained of credit demand is met by the semi-formal and informal sectors. Semi-formal credit is provided by the national and international programs targeting a selective range of borrowers and conforming to certain development targets (Pham and Lensink, 2007) . The informal sector consists of private moneylenders, revolving credit associations (RCA), relatives, friends and other individuals. Pham and Izumida (2002) , using data from a small household survey undertaken in 1995, found that the informal sector accounted for 17% of all loans. As in other developing countries RCAs are common in Vietnam, where they are called hui. These RCAs are groups of people with pre-established social ties who pool a small sum of their savings periodically so that each can in turn receive one large sum.
Chart 1 shows the operational procedures of formal credit in Vietnam, such as applied by the VBARD bank. Most borrowers are individuals or private com- 
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panies. As most of them do not have accountant records, it is very difficult for them to communicate with the banks and also difficult for the banks to acquire information about them. These banks are mostly based in the large cities or provincial towns. They are thus operating at a fair distance from the potential borrowers located in rural areas. One way for the banks to mitigate the problem is to ask for collateral, i.e. land use rights and other valuable assets.
In programs towards poor and vulnerable households, the Vietnamese Government included credit provision through microfinance institutions (MFIs) in their anti-poverty programs for the rural areas (Commins et al., 2001 ). Some Notes: 1. Bank officials receive loan application forms from the applicant; 2. After receiving loan application forms, bank officials report to the head of the credit department; 3. The head of the credit department assigns a bank official to examine the loan application forms to see if it is filled in properly; 4. The assigned bank official appraises the applicant, mainly based on collateral; 5. The assigned bank official informs the head of the credit department about the applicant; 6. The head of the credit department assesses the information and reports it to the director of the bank; 7. Director of the bank decides on the loan and informs the head of the credit department; 8. The head of credit department informs the assigned bank official about the decision; 9. The assigned bank officer informs the applicant; 10, 11, 12. Internal information among the bank's specialized departments; 13. The treasury department disburses loans to the applicant, if accepted. Source: Adapted from Ninh (2003) .
of the programs target women who are found to be more credit constrained than men. These are programs focusing on female clientele who often join in groups, providing small loans for them to invest in income-generating activities (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005) . The expected outcome is that rural female entrepreneurs can cope better with emergencies such as unfavorable natural events or be protected from further impoverishment during economic stress (Rutherford, 2002) . Women are also considered to be more reliable clients and to invest more in education and health care of their families (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005) . The operation of the MFIs show in chart 2.
In the case of informal lenders, the credit procedures of this form are very simple and mainly based on personal relationships between lenders and borrowers. In fact if an individual household facing an urgent problem would like to borrow from the moneylenders, he/she needs to just ask the lenders. The terms of the loan will depend on their relationship. If the borrower is well- known and has a good relation to the lender, the probability of borrowing and size of the loan will be bigger. The credit procedure in this case is very short. Malcolm Darling (1925) wrote for the informal lender that:
He is always accessible, even at night; dispenses with troublesome formalities, asks no inconvenient questions, advances promptly, and if interest is paid, does not press for repayment of principal. He keeps in close personal touch with his clients, and in many villages shares their occasions of weal or woe. With his intimate knowledge of those around him he is able, without serious risk, to finance those who would otherwise get no loan at all.
In the MD, there are mainly two types of lenders, namely formal (VBARD and VBSP) and informal lenders (private, friends, and relatives). The main differences between VBARD and VBSP versus informal lenders are summarized in table 1. The private banks are not operating in the study areas. The traditional approach to lending is compared to informal lending in table 2 with regards to the characteristics and behavior of the lenders. High but lowered by personal relationship.
Although being part of government programs, the formal institutions seem not to be able to adequately respond to the demand for credit by the households. First, not all households who would like or need to take out credit, are accepted as clients because they fail to provide a proof of sufficient collateral. Secondly, the terms of loans may not be appropriate. Especially the limited length of the loan may be restrictive to farmers who need the loan for an investment early in the planting season while they can only repay at the harvest, too late for the bank. Thirdly, the administrative procedures could be a serious burden to the rural household. Potential borrowers need to hand in application forms, production plans, and guarantee evidence. And they get repayment plans and claims in return. These procedures may be too important burden for low educated rural households. Individual and household characteristics such as age, gender, household size, education level, race and the household's wealth status (expenditure per capita) have been found to significantly affect a household's access to (formal) credit (Okurut, 2006; Mohamed, 2003) . In addition, the composition of household assets is found to be much more important than the total value of household assets or landholding size as a determinant of household access to formal credit. Okurut (2006) finds that higher shares of land and livestock in the total value of household assets are positively correlated with access to formal credit. However, Diagne (1999) notes that size of the landholding is a significant determinant of access to informal credit. Okurut (2006) also shows that access to semi-formal credit in South Africa is positively and significantly affected by household size, per capita expenditure, provincial location and being colored, while the negative and significant factors include being male, rural location, being poor and White.
Studies in Vietnam show that characteristics of the household, level of household expenditure and asset levels have a significant effect on the probability of borrowing by rural households and on the size of the loan provided to them (Ha, 1999; Ha, 2001) . The probability of borrowing increases with education and social responsibility of the household heads. Age negatively influences the probability of borrowing, but it has a positive effect on loan size. Household size has a negative effect on the probability to borrow as well as on the amount borrowed (Ha, 1999) .
In this paper we test if several of these characteristics are also important for credit uptake and loan amount in the Mekong Delta in Vietnam by using Heckman selection and double hurdle approaches. Our results should facilitate identifying and targeting potential borrowers which could contribute to credit deepening and widening and as such could close the gap between credit demand and supply. Financial organizations need to know who they are able to reach in order to broaden their clientele base; and on the other hand, it is important to know how much people borrow and by what this is determined, in order to address the demand for credit in a better way.
Methodology

Sampling, research area and data collection
The data used in this paper was obtained from interviewing households in three provinces in the Mekong Delta namely: Can Tho, Soc Trang, and Tra Vinh. These provinces are chosen because their distinct socio-economic characteristics are representative for the Mekong Delta provinces. Can Tho city is the most important economic, cultural, scientific and technological center of the Mekong Delta. Since we are particularly interested in rural credit, data was collected from the more rural district of Thoi Lai, which is recently divided into two new districts namely Thoi Lai and Co Do. These districts traditionally supplied agricultural products and services to the urban areas of Can Tho. It furthermore hosts the headquarters of an agricultural research institute that supports rice production in the region. The second province, Soc Trang, is characterized by more ethnic diversity than Can Tho. Its economy is based on agriculture and the area is more prone flooding. The district of Thanh Tri was chosen for this study because it is found to be representative to the economic activities in the province. Finally, the province of Tra Vinh was chosen for its distinctive rural characteristics. Households were randomly selected in the Cau Ngang district. They are mainly employed in arable farming and production of seafood. In total 325 households were interviewed, of whom 219 (67%) households had access to credit, and 106 (33%) had not. The distribution of the respondents over the provinces is shown in table 3.
The MD has experienced a considerable decline in the poverty rate since 1998. The poverty rate for MD in 2009 was 12.6%, lower than the overall country rate of 14.2% (GSO, 2010) . The poverty rate has fallen over the last decades, but in the rural areas poverty remains significant. The reason are complex but the main causes are landless and land scarcity, lack of opportunity for stable non-farm employment, and lack of market participation (GSO, 2010).
Analytical Method
Biases due to sample selection arise because it is often not possible to identify a perfectly random sample of the population of interest. Particularly when observations are selected in a process that is not perfectly independent of the outcome of interest, selection effects may lead to biased coefficients in regressions of the different outcomes (Heckman et al. 1998 ). This may result in inconsistent estimates. In order to avoid these problems, one of the most commonly used approaches in econometrical analyses is the Heckman selection model (Schaffner, 2002; Schafgens and Zinde-Walsh, 2002; Vreeland, 2002; Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000) . The two-step method includes the estimation of a probit model for selection, followed by the addition of correction factor which is the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the probit model, into the second ordinary least square model of interest (Gujarati and Porter, 2009) . Factors assumed to influence the uptake of credit are usually categorized as either knowledge based and poverty based (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003) . Knowledge based determinants includes age and education (Kimuyu and Omiti, 2000; Zeller 1993; 1994) ; family business history, entrepreneurial experience, industry specific know-how, training and social capital, (Lore, 2007) . Property based determinants are land size, livestock, and other assets. Determinants of borrowing tested in this paper include age, gender, educational level, religion, marital status, family size, ethnic group, community involvement, red certificate of land use right, building value, distance to market center, and location of households.
In the second step, determinants of the loan size are explored. The first hurdle of taking up credit may result in a selection bias which is why we need control for these effects. One possible source of bias is that better-off, better educated, and more experienced households take out larger loans. A Heckman selection model was used to analyze the extent to which selection biases may affect the loan size. Determinants considered to influence loan size are the age, gender, educational level, religion, marital status, ethnic group, family size, community involvement, total land size, building value, and location of households, the instrumental variable of participation is distance to market center of households. The model estimations were done in Stata.
Double hurdle model (DHM)
This paper also uses a DHM formulated by Cragg (1971) assuming that the individual (or households) make two decisions concerning the borrowing. Each decision stage is determined by a different set of factors. According to the behavioral content of this model, two separate hurdles must be passed before a positive loan size can be obtained. The first hurdle involves decision about whether or not to access to formal credit (participation decision). It is reasonable to assume that the choice of access to credit, like the decision to smoke, is an economic decision and is influenced by social and demographic issues (Blaylock and Blisard, 1993) . The second hurdle concerns on the level of loan obtained by the households that may be affected by various factors related to households as well as financial institution's characteristics. The two decisions can be regressed as dependent on or independent of each other. According to Lee and Maddala (1985) , the two decisions have been modeled as sequential.
Formally, following Jones (1989) and Pudney (1989) , the double hurdle model can be specified as follows: Where W is defined whether the households decide to take out credit, Y* is latent variable showing households' loan amount obtained, Y is the observed dependent variables (the amount of money the household obtained), Z is a vector of variables explaining the credit participation decision, X is a vector of variables determining on the credit amount, u and v are the corresponding error terms assumed to be independent and distributed as u ϵ N(0,1) and v ϵ N(0,δ 2 ). The independence of the error terms is a common assumption in these type of models (Jensen and Yen, 1996; Su and Yen, 1996) .
Assuming that the error terms u and v are independent, the model can be assigned to follow Cragg model (Cragg, 1971) in which zero loan amount has subscript p, positive loan amount is shown by a subscript +.
The Cragg model is a two-step approach with a probit model for probability of participation in the first stage and truncated normal regression in the second stage.
An alternative assumption is to hypothesize that the error terms of the participation and loan amount equations are correlated, and that the participation decision dominates the loan amount equation. Jones (1989) refers to this case as a first hurdle dominance. The model implies that observed zero loan amounts are the result of participation decisions only and that once the first hurdle is passed censoring is no longer appropriate. This suggests that only individual households with positive loan amount are included in the loan amount equation. The presence of first hurdle dominance results in a Heckman selection model, which is discussed next.
Heckman Selection Model
In the Heckman selection model, household's decision to take a loan is assumed to be influenced by a number of household characteristics, as shown in the following equation (Greene, 2000) :
If Z i * is a dummy that a household takes a loan, equation (1) measures the probability that a household i has access to formal credit; L i is a vector of exogenous household variables that affect Z i *. The variable Z i * is not observed, but we observe if the household has access to credit or not, whereby Z i = 1 if Z i * > 0 and
Next, household characteristics are also assumed to influence the size of the loan the households take up. Under the condition that Z i = 1, Y i represents the log of the loan size expectedly received by each household, with the assumption that:
where X i is the vector of variables determining the loan size. In equations (4) and (5), u i and v i have bivariate normal distributions with zero means, standard deviation δ u and δ v , and they are correlated with correlation coefficient ρ. It is assumed that Z i and L i are observed for a random sample of individual households, but Y i is observed only when Z i =1, that is, when the rural household i has access to formal credit. Modified from the equation by Heckman (1979) , the expected loan size may be written as follows:
And φ and Ø are the normal density function and normal distribution function, respectively. The function µ i (α u ) is called the inverse Mill's ratio. A least squares regression of Y i on X i , without the term µ i (α u ), would yield inconsistent estimators of b i . If the expected value of the error was known, it could be included in the regression as an extra explanatory variable, removing that part of the error correlated with the explanatory variables and avoiding inconsistency. Yet the error term cannot be estimated, and the inverse Mills ratio needs to be calculated and added to the estimation of equation (5).
The first step of the Heckman model is a probit model (equation 4). The inverse Mill's ratio is calculated from the linear prediction of this model. In the second step model, Y is regressed on the explanatory variables X and the Inverse Mill's ratio for all cases where the selection equation equals one, i.e. household has access to formal credit. A highly significant Inverse Mill's Ratio indicates that selection bias is present. This model is solved in one procedure in Stata.
Empirical Results
The following sections present the results of our analyses. We start by describing the credit institutions from which the households had taken out loans and we describe the major characteristics of these loans. Next, we give an overview of the household characteristics in the study area. We compare households per province and by whether or not they had borrowed money. The model results are given next.
Table 4
Specification variables in the propensity score of models
Whether households access to credit which takes the value of 1 if the households take credit, 0 otherwise.
The age of household head in years X 2
Gender: 1 if the head is male, 0 otherwise X 3
Educational level (years) X 4
Religion: 1 at least one religion, 0 otherwise X 5
Marital status: 1 if married, 0 otherwise X 6 Vietnamese ethnic: 1 for Vietnamese households, 0 otherwise X 7
Family size (person) X 8 Dependency ratio in percent X 9 Have a job in village: 1 having a job in village for community building, 0 otherwise X 10 Total land in use (in 1,000 m 2 ) X 11 Red certificate of land use right: 1 have certificate, 0 otherwise X 12 The value of building hold by households (1,000 dongs) X 13 The distance to the market center of households (m (VBSP report, 2008 ). In our sample, 53% of the respondents borrowed from VBSP and 42% from VBARD; the rest of the loans (about 5%) were given by other financial institutions such as People Credit Fund (Figure 2) . The VBSP provides credit in two forms. People can borrow directly from its branches or via social economic unions. The most important unions for VBSP lending are, Farmer's Union, Women's Union, Youth's Union and War Veteran's Union. In the sample, these social economic unions accounted for more than 94% of the share of the credit borrowed through VBSP which indicates their importance in helping the poor to access credit. Following its objectives of poverty alleviation and social development, the VBSP does not require its clients who are poor households, charity households, or poor students to offer collateral for the loans. Most of the clients, however, need to have proofs of collateral endorsed by the local government or other authorities related to the VBSP banks.
VBARD offers individual loans to rural farmers and entrepreneurs. A land use certificate may be used as collateral. Secondly, VBARD also accepts borrowers in organizations who are unable to provide collateral. Loans are channeled through so-called guarantee groups composed of the members of women unions, citizen unions, and veterans unions. Collateral is not required as the organization guarantees VBARD of the loan repayment. 3.74*** Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses *: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%. 
Loan characteristics
The loan characteristics by type of borrowing scheme and type of bank are compared in tables 5 and 6. Individual households had the largest average loans with 18,970 thousand dongs1 while group-based households had on average loans of 10,150 thousand dongs. The interest rates charged per year on the households were 12 and 10% for individual and group-based lending, respectively. The average duration of the loans was about 20 months, but it tended to differ by type of borrowing scheme. Shorter loans were given to individual households (17 months), while the longer loans were provided to groupbased households (24 months). The Vietnam Banks of Agricultural and Rural Development (VBARD) offers larger loans amount (18,000 thousand dongs on average) than Vietnam Bank Social Policy (VBSP) with 10,198 thousand dongs while VBARD charges higher interest rates (12 percent/year) than the VBSP with 10% /year. Figure 3 shows that most of the borrowers have an average loan of 14,000 thousand dongs. Only seven households in the sample borrowed more than 40,000 thousand dongs. Overall, the credit supplied by the formal financial institutions in the rural areas of Mekong Delta is rather limited. 4.03*** Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses *: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%. Tables 7 and 8 compare the household characteristics of borrowers and nonborrowers. Households having taken out credit were relatively older than those who had not. In terms of education, non-borrowers had on average a lower educational level than the individual-borrowers, but higher than groupbased borrowers. Most of the borrowers had completed at least nine years of schooling. Among the borrowers, 46% were of Vietnamese origin compared to 61% among the non-borrowers. The average family size of both borrowers and nonborrowers was five persons. It is furthermore hypothesized that if the household head has any social and/or political position in the village, he or she may have a high probability of receiving formal credit and would be less likely to borrow from the informal sector. Yet, this could not be confirmed by the chisquared analysis. About 18% of borrowers and non-borrowers were involved in village work.
Household Characteristics of Borrowers and Non-Borrowers
Total landholding has been considered an important determinant of access to credit (Okurut, 2006; Vu, 2002; Zeller et al. 2001) . It is hypothesized that households with more land are more likely to have an interest to expand production and a higher probability of borrowing. Land can also be used as collateral for the loan. In the survey, the average total landholding of individual and group-based borrowers was about 15,490 m², and 6,380 m², respectively while that of non-borrowers was about 11,660 m². Notes: (1): Non borrowers; (2) Individual borrowers; (3): Group-based borrowers *: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%.
Another possible important determinant is the total income of households. The results show statistical differences in the total income between borrowers and non-borrowers. The total incomes of individual borrowers was statistically higher than the income of group-based borrowers and non-borrowers. On average, group-based borrowers were poorest.
Determinants of Access to Credit by Rural Households
Following the results of the probit model, access to credit was positively related to the marital status, not living far from the market center, and living in Can Tho or Tra Vinh province (table 9 ). Yet, the determinants of access to credit differed by borrowing scheme. The coefficients in table 9 show that the probability of individual access to credit is positively affected by the value of building and negatively related to Vietnamese ethnicity, family size, distance to the market center and being in the Soc Trang province. The access to credit by the group-based schemes is positively affected by the marital status and having a community work, but negatively affected by education, total land size, distance to the market center, and being in Can Tho province. Clearly these group-based schemes target poorer households.
Table 9
Factor affecting access to credit of rural households Access to credit (Probit model)
Variables
(1) (2)
Age ( The determinants of the loan amount as calculated in the second step of Heckman selection and double hurdle models are illustrated in table 10. The results show that the loan amount in general is positively related to the given age, having a job in the community, assets, and having a small family. Loan sizes in group-based schemes seem to be higher for households with lower dependency ratio, having a job in the community, more land and a higher value of building, not being in the Can Tho province. The double hurdle model additionally indicates that female household heads and households with Vietnamese ethnicity may have larger loan amount. For the individual borrowers, the loan size obtained by the households is positively affected by a smaller family size, having a job in the community, more land and larger building value in both two approaches. In addition, the double hurdle model predicts that households having at least one religion and being of Vietnamese ethnicity are likely to take out larger loans.
Selection bias could not be proven as the inverse mills ratio was not significant in the Heckman models. The findings confirmed that the physical and social capital are significant determinants of access to credit and the loan amount for individual borrowers. In the group-based models, human and social capital, i.e. marital status and having a community work, seem to be important. 
Conclusions and Implications
This paper investigates the determinants of demand for formal credit by rural households of Mekong Delta in Vietnam. The findings indicate that a household's capital endowments are very important in the demand for formal credit as well as loan amount. Other factors influencing the decision to borrow were the marital status, distance to the market center, and location of households. The findings are similar to those of previous studies (Mohamed, 2003; Ha, 2001; Ha, 1999; Bell et al., 1997) . It is clear that both the household's available collateral, its capability to search and process information on credit as well as its potential to make use of the credit, are important. As also indicated by Pham and Lensink (2007) the availability of collateral is important in formal lending. One of the major reasons why households are not borrowing is their lack of proof of collateral. Especially land ownership has been shown as important. Having collateral, or an institutional arrangement that overcomes the need for collateral such as group lending or government insurances, is a first step in closing the gap between demand and supply. Yet, as explained in Armendariz and Morduch (2005) , this need for collateral even for small loans excludes the poorest of the poor, for whom the gap between demand and supply of credit seems to persist. The VBARD issues loans without collateral, yet they require group liability. In forming those lending groups, members may self-select themselves in or out. It is very probable that again the poorest of the poor are excluded.
Apart from collateral, households need to have the capacity to overcome other transaction costs in taking a loan. Apart from the evident costs of applying for a loan (filing the paperwork, going to the bank's branch, and attending group meetings), potential borrowers are expected to search and process information on the lender, loan procedures, loan conditions, and loan interest rates. Our results suggest that location is of great importance, with households in Can Tho having a lower probability to borrow. This is due to the fact that most of small ethnic group who are benefiting from the cheap credit or other government programs located in Soc Trang and Tra Vinh. Furthermore, the households with more social capital seemed to be more likely to borrow larger sums. If the institutions want to increase their clientele base, especially in the rural of Soc Trang and Tra Vinh provinces, they could consider making more efforts in reaching the potential clients in a strategy of financial outreach.
Our experiences in the field suggest that most of households in the surveyed location have limited information on formal credit accessibility. Sometimes, the households are in need of credit, they would like to borrow from formal credit sectors but they could not know what to do. It is significant to suggest that financial institutions in Mekong Delta in general and in three given provinces in particular, could make more efforts in exchanging and transferring information on the credit procedures in the rural villages. This would arguably not only increase the potential interest of households, but also improve the compliance of the clients to the bank's rules and regulations. Moreover, financial institutions need to innovate and upgrade their activities such as human resource management, encouragement policies as well as apply new technologies in bank transfer. These will promote the financial institutions to reach more clients more effectively and efficiently. Furthermore, diversifying the type of loans offered and loan products such as lending for project investments could help rural households to plan loan expenses based on their production cycles. In addition, financial institutions could adapt the loan producers to their rural clients' constraints. Finally, the institutions should consider the loan duration by focusing on medium and long-term loan contracts that could help for example to mobilize the agricultural and rural development. Developing specific proposals towards these types of credit widening and deepening for the Mekong Delta is an area for future research.
